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The aim of this paper is to analyze the selection process at work before and after 
compulsory schooling by assessing the determinants of school failures, dropouts and upper 
secondary school decisions of young Italians. The dataset is built combining individual data 
from the Labor Force Survey and aggregate data on local labor markets and school supply 
from the Italian National Statistical Institute and the Ministry of Education, respectively. Our 
results show that school failure (i.e., repetition of a year) is highly correlated to family 
background, and strongly affects later choices. Early school leaving and upper secondary 
school choice are mainly a reflection of parents’ socio-economic status. The effectiveness of 
the educational system in narrowing the risk of failure and the scholastic outflow depends on 
the widespread adoption of full-time attendance in compulsory school, the quality of school 
infrastructures and the reduction of the number of teachers on temporary contracts. 
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1.  Introduction
1 
The accumulation of human capital represents a critical element both when defining the 
socioeconomic condition of an individual as well as for the development and progress of a 
nation. At a microeconomic level, educational benefits are such that the better educated an 
individual is the higher his employment probability and the steeper his age-earnings profile. In 
macroeconomic terms, the level and quality of human capital represent compelling and driving 
forces for the economic growth of a nation.
2 The process for the acquisition of human capital 
includes different formal education cycles plus training in the work environment. When 
looking at this education path, we focus our attention on the transition from compulsory 
school to upper secondary school, which in Italy normally happens when a young person 
reaches age 14. More specifically, this paper primarily concentrates on two specific issues: the 
first is the analysis of school failures during compulsory school; the second concerns the 
young individuals’ choices after the completion of compulsory school. 
Understanding the nature and determinants of these phenomena is important for several 
reasons. First, a decrease in the dropout rate immediately after compulsory school has become 
one of the major items on the EU member States’ political agendas since the importance of 
this issue was highlighted at the Lisbon Conference.
3 Second, an analysis of the determinants 
of the early selection process is necessary to better understand the results of international 
surveys, such as PISA, since a not negligible fraction of 15-year-old Italians do not attend 
upper secondary school and therefore are not interviewed. Finally, given that economics is 
often defined as the theory of choice, the transition from compulsory to upper secondary 
school represents the first circumstance when an individual faces a choice. Moreover, given its 
strong influence on future education and one’s professional career, this is probably one of the 
most important decisions an individual will ever make.
4  
Such a transition has been the subject of intense political debate where the feasibility of 
raising the bar for compulsory school and redefining school tracks are highly contentious 
subjects. On one hand, differentiation of the educational path, where a course of studies is 
chosen early, may provide a good opportunity to specialize one’s skills and knowledge. 
Furthermore, a school system organized in separate tracks may provide different prospects to 
students with different abilities and it may be capable of matching them to their most 
                                                 
1 I am particularly indebted to Paolo Sestito for his helpful guidance and to Gianna Barbieri for providing me data on Italian 
educational system. I am also grateful to Valentino Dardanoni, two anonymous referees and participants at the Sixth Labor 
Economics Workshop " Brucchi Luchino" in Salerno. A previous version titled “Scelte post-obbligo e dispersione scolastica 
nella scuola secondaria” benefited from presentations at the XIX SIEP Conference in Pavia and at internal seminar held at the 
Bank of Italy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
2 In addition, education is typically correlated with improvements in health, a decline in the crime rate, and an increase in the 
use of liberty rights. 
3 By international standards, Italy is characterized by low educational attainment, even if most recent cohorts seem to catch up 
in order to reduce the gap; in 2007, still one young individual out of five (age bracket 18–24) leaves school early. 
4 Although formally open, the educational system in Italy is de facto a tracked and closed system because the educational 
career is heavily conditioned on early track choices.   4
appropriate destinations. As a consequence, it may also encourage school participation to less 
motivated and less capable youngsters. On the other hand, the extension of compulsory school 
on the grounds of a comprehensive educational system will allow a common consolidation of 
every student’s abilities and will reduce the role of the family in educational choices, fostering 
young individuals to give more thought to their own interests and skills.
5 When tracking takes 
place at early ages, pupils’ abilities and interests can only be measured with substantial noise; 
this may lead to errors in the educational choice process, thus increasing the risk of future 
failures, track changes or, even, dropouts. 
Our goal is to put some empirical evidence into the debate and, in particular, we want to 
assess i) how much family background matters, ii) the role of the labor market in explaining 
post-compulsory educational choices, and iii) how the educational system performs in 
removing social stratification, and what are the most effective policies in reducing school 
failures and dropouts. Unfortunately we cannot adequately keep ability under control and we 
cannot disentangle direct and indirect effects of family background (more on this below); 
therefore, our estimated coefficients have to be interpreted as total effect of family 
background. As far as the school variables are concerned, we extended the set of covariates 
including, apart from traditional school inputs such as the pupils-class ratio, those related to 
the functioning of the educational system (i.e. the adoption of full time), the quality of school 
infrastructures and those that measure the composition (and not only the size) of the teachers 
pool. The availability of these variables represents one of the innovative features of this paper. 
The dataset is built combining individual data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) and 
aggregate data on local labor markets and school supply provided by the Italian National 
Statistic Institute (Istat) and Minister of Public Education (MPE), respectively. The school 
failures during compulsory school and the young individuals’ choices after the completion of 
compulsory school are examined with two distinct empirical exercises. 
In the first, we select a sample of 15-year-old Italians and we observe whether they have 
already experienced a school failure. Despite the relevance of this phenomenon, any analyses 
of its determinants are rather scanty. We find that parents’ schooling significantly reduces the 
likelihood of repeating the year for their children. The failure risk for children whose parents 
have only compulsory education is 10 times more than that of children from graduated. Given 
that having to repeat a year of school strongly affects decisions in later stages and it is strongly 
correlated with the family background, we argue that the social selection process starts in 
compulsory schooling. The effectiveness of the educational system when narrowing the failure 
risk relies on the widespread adoption of full-time attendance in compulsory school and the 
fewer teachers with temporary contracts. Full time seems to play a role also in reducing the 
impact of family background. On the contrary, the pupils-class ratio does not have a 
significant effect. 
                                                 
5  The debate on school reform reflects a concern about the role of education in the current economic context that is 
characterized by the importance of specialization but also by the ongoing transformation of production processes, leaving 
human capital to be considered obsolete in a shorter time frame with respect to the recent past.   5
In the second empirical exercise, we consider a flow sample obtained selecting all the 
individuals who complete compulsory school the year before the interview. We observe what 
they decided: whether to quit school or to continue with upper secondary school; if the latter 
was the case, we observe the type of school chosen. The single most powerful predictor of 
dropping out is previous school failure; its impact is sizeable for less educated parents and 
almost negligible for the more educated. Among the school inputs, full time and better school 
infrastructures positively affect the probability of staying in school. On the contrary, we didn’t 
find any significant relationship between unemployment rate and early dropout behaviors. As 
far as school track is concerned, those who continue to study make a choice that strongly 
affects later school transitions and professional career. However, most of the literature has 
investigated the determinants of the level of education achieved (the number of years of 
schooling or the highest educational qualification) whereas the type of the education is less 
explored.
6   We find that these decisions depend upon the cultural capital and the 
socioeconomic status of the parents, which highlights, once again, the feebleness of the Italian 
educational system to create a mechanism for mixing different social classes. Basically, the 
son whose parents have a college degree has a higher probability of choosing an academically 
oriented education (licei), whereas the choice of the son of a blue-collar worker will likely be 
a technical or vocational school. A higher incidence of services, rather than industry, among 
economic activities seems to play a role in driving enrollment decisions, especially towards 
technical and vocational schools. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical and 
literature background. In section 3 we present a descriptive assessment of the variables that 
have been considered for the research. In section 4, we examine the determinants of scholastic 
delay during compulsory school. In section 5, we analyze educational choices right after 
compulsory school focusing on early dropouts and, for those who continue, the school choice. 
Section 6 contains concluding remarks and discusses some policy options. 
2.  The Theoretical Framework 
The selection process at work before and after the completion of compulsory school is 
highly relevant because student results and choices at this age have a strong influence on 
future education and one’s professional career. The aim of this paper is to empirically assess i) 
how much family background matters, ii) what is the role of the labor market in post-
compulsory educational choices, and iii) how the educational system perform in reducing 
school failures and dropouts and what are the most effective policies. 
As widely emphasized by the literature, family background plays a crucial role in a 
child’s education (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
7 The impact of family background can operate 
                                                 
6 See, among the few exceptions, Ashworth and Evans (2001), Montmarquette et al. (2002), Nguyen and Taylor (2003), 
Dustmann (2004) and, for Italy, Checchi and Flabbi (2006). 
7 See also Ermisch and Francesconi (2001). Checchi et al. (1999), Checchi and Zollino (2001), Checchi et al. (2007) and 
Mocetti (2007) find a strong immobility across generations in Italy.   6
through several channels. The literature on educational attainment usually refers to direct and 
indirect effects. Direct effects, whether genetic or cultural, create disparities in “demonstrated 
ability” depending on the social origin (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002). Parents can transmit 
to their children genetic skills or traits that may foster or impede educational career. In 
addition, environmental influences in the post-birth period may affect the cognitive 
development and human capital formation. Indirect effects are those that operate through the 
choices that children, together with their parents, actually make among the options they have 
available. They are supposed to explain why, even when level of demonstrated ability is held 
constant, children of more advantaged class origins take more ambitious educational options – 
for instance, stay on rather than leave or choose academic rather than vocational courses – 
than do children of less advantaged origins. Focusing on young individuals while they are still 
living with their families, we are able to trace the occupational status and educational level of 
both parents: these variables are supposed to capture the economic status and cultural 
background of the family. Unfortunately individual ability is not observable and we cannot 
separately identify primary and secondary effects. Therefore our estimated coefficients have to 
be interpreted as total effect of family background. 
The local labor market is the context in which to evaluate the profitability of investment 
in human capital. However its role, such as that of unemployment rate, is far more uncertain. 
On one hand, a high probability of employment might convince students to quit school and 
enter the labor market. On the other hand, the higher expected education returns could 
definitely be a stimulus for acquiring further education.
8  We also consider the prevailing 
sectors of activity in order to analyze the relationship between the demand of the local labor 
market and the investment in level and type of education.  
Finally, an analysis on the effectiveness of school inputs can provide some suggestions 
about policy options. However, the estimations of educational production functions are 
complicated because there are many outputs from education and many inputs in the production 
process, and also because it may be difficult to obtain good measures of both of them.
9 
Measures of school inputs typically include expenditure per pupil and class size. Nonetheless, 
the empirical evidence seems to counteract their relevance.
10 Furthermore, these indicators are 
not the proper ones for Italy where, from a formal standpoint, the scholastic system reveals a 
high level of standardization. That is, school programs are comparatively homogeneous and 
the number of students per class and/or per school is often a consequence of the needs 
imposed by the territorial context, rather than real quality indicators. We have therefore 
considered other variables in an attempt to better identify and assess all inputs on the school 
production function. These variables include: the adoption of full time in compulsory school, 
                                                 
8 Rees and Mocan (1997) and Rice (1999) found a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the dropout risk. 
9  Measures of outputs are typically student performance (measured by cognitive tests or school failures), educational 
attainment, or labor-market outcomes (particularly earnings). 
10 There exists an extensive literature on the effect of school inputs on students’ outcomes; see, among others, Card and 
Krueger (1996), Hoxby (1998), Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Hanushek (2003). The majority of the empirical studies do not 
find a significant relationship between resources employed and school outputs; if this were true, then an increase in the 
amount of resources would have only a negligible effect on students’ learning and school outflow.   7
the quality of school infrastructures and the percentage of teachers with temporary contracts. 
The adoption of full time is important for several reasons. It solves practical problems for 
those families where both parents work, and it represents an opportunity for the educational 
development of those who come from a less-advantaged families and with a smaller amount of 
cultural capital at home. Additional time at school may also afford more chances to fill the gap 
for those who stay behind and to better organize the didactics and the learning moments. The 
low maintenance on certain buildings and the use of school structures that are inappropriate 
for teaching activities may affect the level and quality of the teaching itself and could 
consequently create a rather unstimulating school environment. Poor school infrastructures 
can also approximate the level of spending of local authorities and how much education is 
evaluated in the local context. Finally, it is a matter of fact that students’ achievements are 
affected by teachers’ quality and motivation.
11 However, reliable information about these traits 
is not available. We try to gain insights about teachers’ effort and motivation looking at the 
composition of the teachers’ pool in terms of temporary vs. permanent contracts. In Italy, 
temporary contracts are used to fill vacancies due to absences and to the fact that tenured 
teachers are lower than needed teaching positions; furthermore, they are not used as screening 
devices, also because of the lack of an evaluation system (Barbieri et al., 2007). Therefore, we 
consider the incidence of temporary teachers in the teachers’ pool as a proxy of the degree of 
motivation and effort of the teaching staff. The assumption is that temporary teachers have a 
lower incentive to well perform since their future chances depend on the accumulation of 
seniority rights rather than their teaching activity, they have a shorter temporal perspective of 
the job and it is absent any evaluation mechanism for their activity. Negative implications of 
temporary contracts include also the peregrination of teachers among school with lack of 
didactical continuity and lesser knowledge of the needs of the class. 
3.  Data and Variables 
The following subsections describe the dataset and the explanatory variables and provide a 
first descriptive assessment of the educational attainment of young Italians and of the 
institutional and structural features of the Italian education system. 
3.1    Data 
Information about individual educational outcomes is drawn from LFS. The main scope of the 
survey is to supply accurate and official statistics regarding the employed and unemployed 
population in Italy. Furthermore, it also offers an interesting section concerning individuals’ 
choice about schooling and training. This survey is carried out on a quarterly basis, and the 
                                                 
11 Aaronson et al. (2007), using administrative data from the Chicago public high schools, find that “teachers matter” and that 
the vast majority of the variation in teacher effects on student mathematics test score gains is unexplained by traditional 
human capital measures. Unfortunately, microdata on youngsters’ teachers are not available and we proxy their characteristics 
with administrative data at a province level. See Barbieri et al. (2007) for an analysis of the socioeconomic conditions of the 
teachers and the characteristics of their labor market in Italy.   8
representative sample is approximately 76.800 families per period. Individuals are interviewed 
from their fifteenth birthday onwards.
 We rely on data gathered in 2004 and 2005.  
In the first empirical exercise we focus on the determinants of school delay for 15-year 
olds. The sample was composed of all 15-year olds who were interviewed during the first half 
of the year and who had birthday before the interview. In order to provide a graphical picture 
of the phenomenon being analyzed, Table 1 lists all the possible situations faced by the 
youngsters, just as the database identified them. We remind everyone that a 15-year old 
Italian, in a regular course of studies, have completed compulsory school and is attending, in 
the first semester of the year, his first year of upper secondary school.
12 Four  different 
scenarios can be noted: more than 4 percent of 15-year-old Italians drop out of the educational 
system, and there is a fraction of these who leave school without any certificate. A significant 
percentage of the students (nearly 8 percent) are behind in their schooling and are still enrolled 




Table 1: The educational status of 15-year olds (1) 
  All sample  North South 
Not enrolled and never completed compulsory school  0.7  0.3 1.2 
Not enrolled after completion of compulsory school  3.5  2.7 4.4 
Still enrolled in compulsory school (delay)  7.9  7.5 8.5 
Regularly enrolled in upper secondary school  87.9  89.5 85.9 
Source: LFS. 
(1) The sample includes all 15-year olds who were interviewed during the first half of the year (2004 or 2005) and who had birthday before the 
interview. The number of observations is 1,837. 
In the second empirical exercise, the sample is composed of all youngsters aged 15-19 
who have been interviewed during the first half of the year and who completed the 
compulsory school the year before. Therefore, this flow sampling includes both those who are 
“regular” and those who completed compulsory school with a delay. The latter represent 7.2 
percent of the sample and a fraction of these (1.6 per cent) repeated at least 2 years in 
compulsory school. About 5 percent of the youngsters choose to not continue their education; 
there are also territorial differences, with the South lagging behind in terms of early dropout 
rates. Conversely, about 95 percent of the youngsters are enrolled in upper secondary school, 
                                                 
12 In Italy, compulsory education includes primary (from 6 to 11) and lower secondary school (from 11 to 14). In recent years, 
the system has undergone several reforms. The compulsory school attendance has been raised to age 15 and then to age 16. It 
has also been introduced a generic principle of the right and obligation to receive an education or training until age 18. In fact, 
age 14 has remained an important crossroads. The upper secondary school includes an academically oriented generalist 
education provided by licei (with a further division in humanities, scientific activities, languages, and pedagogical sciences), a 
technically oriented education provided by istituti tecnici (with further differentiations according to the type of job), and 
vocational training offered by istituti di formazione professionale. 
13 The situation described by LFS reflects the same information as that provided by the administrative data. The participation 
rate at 15-years of age is slightly lower than 95 percent, even if 10 percent are still enrolled in compulsory school, and most of 
them have repeated a year in lower secondary school. See tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.   9
most of them in licei and technical schools (see Table 2). Art and teaching school are chosen 
by 11 percent of the sample, with a strong gender divide: the percentage is 4 percent for males 
and rises up to 19 percent for females.
14 
 
Table 2: The educational choices after the completion of compulsory school (1) 
Not enrolled  5.1 
Enrolled  94.9 
Vocational schools  16.3 
Technical schools  31.0 
Licei  36.7 
Art and teaching school  10.9 
Source: LFS. 
(1) The sample includes all the youngsters who complete compulsory school the year before the interview. They were interviewed 
during the first half of the year (2004 or 2005) and had birthday before the interview. The number of observations is 1,553. 
3.2    Explanatory Variables 
The LFS survey has been supplemented with other explanatory variables collected from 
different sources. The set of covariates can be grouped into: (1) Individual characteristics that 
include gender, age, birth order, and family background, which includes parental age, 
education, and employment status, and family size. (2) Location variables, such as the 
presence of a metropolitan area, unemployment rate, and prevailing sectors of activity. (3) 
School characteristics that include the pupils-class ratio, quality of infrastructures, presence of 
full time, and incidence of teachers with temporary contracts. 
Variables in group (1) are drawn directly from LFS. Variables in group (2) come from 
Istat and include sociodemographic indicators and labor-market characteristics of the province 
in which an individual resides.
15 Variables in group (3) are provided by MPE and are collected 
at the province level. Table A.4 in the appendix provides a detailed description of the 
variables, while in the following we describe only some covariates of special interest. 
In Italian lower secondary school there are about 20 pupils per class. Class size is 
slightly larger in the North; however, the pupils-class ratio is quite homogenous across 
provinces. Full time is present in about 30 percent of lower secondary schools. The adoption 
of full time shows substantial territorial differences and depends on several factors. On one 
side, it is demanded by families, especially in those areas where female participation in the 
labor market is higher. There are also supply factors linked to policy goal of local 
administrations and the availability of resources at the local level. The percentage of teachers 
with temporary contracts in lower secondary school is 17 percent; the incidence is larger than 
for the other employees (Barbieri et al., 2007). Finally we have detailed information about the 
quality of school infrastructure. In the North, the percentage of lower secondary school with a 
                                                 
14 Data on track choices reflect those available from administrative sources. See table A.3 in the Appendix. 
15 Province is an intermediate level between region and municipality; we consider a partition of the  territory in 103 provinces.     10
bad hygienic and heating system is 17 and 10 percent, respectively; in the South these 
percentages double. Starting from elementary indicators we built an index that proxy the 
overall quality of school infrastructures. This index is obtained averaging the percentages of 
schools with buildings unfit to school, of those improperly adapted to teaching activity, and of 
those with poor maintenance of floors, heating systems, wirings, bathroom fixtures and 
fittings. See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a graphical picture of the quality of school 
infrastructures across provinces. 
It is likely that other unobserved spatial characteristics play a role in the educational 
choices. In order to avoid misspecification problems and to take into account any 
“geographical” determinants, we include area and regional fixed effects in all regressions.  
4.  School Failures 
To address the determinants of school failures, we select a sample of individual aged 15, the 
minimum age interviewed in the LFS, and we build a dummy that takes the value 1 if i) the 
individual is behind and still enrolled in compulsory school or ii) he is not enrolled and have 
not yet completed compulsory school; it takes 0 otherwise.
16 As shown in Table 1, about 8 
percent of 15-year olds have experienced a school failure in compulsory school.
17 School 
failures are examined using a logit model whose results are reported in Table 3. School 
variables are included separately in columns (1) to (4), and simultaneously in the last column. 
In each specification we added regional fixed effects to take into account region-level 
determinants. 
In all the specifications, substantial gender differences arise and, on average, males have 
twice the probability of being delayed as females. The variables that are closely related to the 
family background appear to be among the most relevant, highlighting the school system’s 
inability to represent a resource and an opportunity for youngsters coming from less-
advantaged families. The cultural capital available inside the family, measured by the parents’ 
schooling, significantly reduces the failure rate for their children; for example, the probability 
of being held back a year for children of graduated is one-tenth that of the children whose 
parents have only completed compulsory school.
18 Further, the probability of school failures is 
correlated with fathers’ employment status: it is higher if the father is a blue-collar worker or 
he has a temporary job.
19 The fact that a mother works, meaning that she is not at home full 
time, does not appear to either support or justify possible anomalies in the educational paths of 
                                                 
16 We consider as school failures also those who leave school without any certificate because de facto they have experienced a 
failure in compulsory school. Those cases are very few and cannot be considered as a further alternative. However, the 
inclusion of these observations does not affect our results. 
17 An educational path that commits the individual to stay longer in compulsory school has a relevant impact in terms of his 
future choices. See section 5 for an analysis of the effect of delay encountered in compulsory schooling on future educational 
choices. 
18 Oreopoulos et al. (2006) document the causal relationship between parents’ education and school failure risk. 
19 These variables may proxy the low status of the father. In addition, the uncertainty of temporary jobs may translate into 
inferior scholastic results for the children.    11
her children. Therefore the social evolution that has characterized the last decades has not 
entailed any negative impact in the education and development of human capital (Hanushek, 
1992).
20 The probability of being behind also increases with the number of siblings because 
family resources along with parental attention for each child decrease in large families.  
The probability of being delayed can also be the result of inefficiencies in the scholastic 
system, which may fail to provide for the adequate educational development of youngsters due 
to a lack of resources or low professionalism and commitment level of the teaching staff.
21 
The adoption of full time and the fewer teachers with temporary contracts are highly 
significant variables and are associated with a lower probability of delay. Both variables have 
a sizeable effect: keeping all the explanatory variables at their mean and moving the incidence 
of full time from the first quartile to the third quartile (the incidence of temporary contract 
from the third quartile to the first quartile) nearly halves the probability of delay. 
Our interpretation of these findings is that full time helps to fill the gap in those areas 
where pupils stay behind thanks to the creation of new learning space. It also increases the 
level of involvement, interaction, and participation by the students in the school activities. 
Furthermore, full time arises as a substitute for the family’s cultural capital: its marginal effect 
is significantly higher in families where both parents have at most compulsory education than 
in families where parents are graduated. This confirms the view that full time represents an 
opportunity to fill educational and cultural gaps, especially for those students who come from 
less-educated families. As far as the incidence of teachers with temporary contracts is 
concerned, the negative effect on the regularity of the educational career can be interpreted as 
a consequence of the lower motivation of the teaching staff, the lesser knowledge of the class 
and the lack of didactical continuity. On the contrary, the quality of school infrastructures and 
the pupils-class ratio do not appear to be significant in reducing the school failures. 
5.  Post-compulsory Educational Choices 
Economics is often defined as the theory of choice. The educational choice – the one taken 
after the completion of compulsory school, which in Italy normally happens at age 14 – 
represents the first time an individual faces a choice and probably one of the most important 
decisions he will ever make regarding his educational and professional career. At that age, 
young individuals choose whether to quit school or to continue with upper secondary school; 
if the latter is the case, they choose the type of school in which they will enroll. Those who 
                                                 
20 The employment status of the mother has an impact that is not predictable ex-ante. The mother’s presence at home may 
imply care and help for the children. However, the participation in the labor market may translate into greater economic 
stability and more resources to invest in the children’s education. In our estimates, the status of the mother is not significant, 
and we can reasonably affirm that female labor-market participation does not represent a drawback for the children. 
21 Note that having experienced a school failure is not a completely objective measure of student competencies. To be more 
precise, while inferior teaching by less-motivated teachers is likely to affect the pupils’ human capital acquisition, the 
relationship with the repetition of one year is less clear. A less-motivated teacher may translate into a lower level of learning 
for students, therefore, a greater probability of experiencing a failure. However, there may be a lower interest by teachers in 
the students’ evaluation and less incentive to let them repeat a year. Therefore some caution is needed in the interpretation of 
the coefficients due to the nature of the outcome variable.   12
leave school have on average a lower employment probability and flatter age-earnings profile. 
Those who continue to study make a decision that in turn strongly affects later transitions.
22 
The dataset is obtained by selecting all the youngsters aged 15-19 who got their license 
the year before the interview; therefore we include also those who completed compulsory 
school with a delay and we can assess its impact on future educational choices (see Table 2).
23 
For clarity of exposition, we discuss separately the determinants of dropout and school choice. 
5.1    Early Dropouts  
Early dropouts are examined using a logit model. The dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the individual dropouts right after compulsory school and 0 if he continues 
to study. Results are reported in Table 4. As above, school variables are included separately in 
columns (1) to (4), and simultaneously in the last two columns. We also gave more spaces to 
variables referring to local labor markets to assess their impact on educational outcomes. 
The abandonment of the education path is weakly correlated with the parents’ education 
and it is affected by fathers’ employment status. In particular, being the son of a blue-collar, of 
an atypical worker or of an inactive person significantly increases the probability of leaving 
school early. Gender differences are negligible whereas being first-born significantly 
decreases the dropout risk. The single most powerful predictor of dropping out is previous 
school failure (see also Rumberger, 1995; and Jimerson et al., 2002). Those who repeated one 
year in compulsory school have a probability of dropping out that is 10 times more than those 
who completed school with no delay. The effect is even stronger for those who repeated 2 year 
or more in compulsory school. Unfortunately it is not possible to correctly identify the 
relationship between delay and dropout: the students lagging behind may be less gifted and 
their future performance may just be a result of their lesser abilities or, alternatively, early 
school failure may lead to lower self-efficacy and aspirations and, through this channel, lower 
educational performances.
24 Once we have established the strong correlation between school 
failure and early dropout, further insights may be drawn from the examination of within-group 
characteristics of the youngsters who are behind. If we contrast those students who 
experienced a school failure and dropout with those who experienced a school failure and 
enroll in upper secondary school, we see that the family background of the groups differs in an 
appreciable way. The parents of the former have lower educational attainments and 
occupational status. The marginal effect of delay on dropout is sizeable when both parents 
have at most compulsory schooling and negligible when they are both graduated. 
                                                 
22  According to Cappellari (2005) the type of the secondary school represents one of the most important variables in 
determining the decision to go to university. 
23 In Checchi and Flabbi (2006) track choices are examined for 15-year olds who are enrolled in upper secondary school. Our 
data has the advantage of also considering those who do not enrol in upper secondary school or complete compulsory school 
with a delay, therefore not suffering from potential sample selection biases (see Cameron and Heckman, 1998). 
24 See Eide and Showalter (2001), Manacorda (2006) and Jacob and Lefgren (2007) for a discussion of the relationship 
between grade failure and future educational outcomes. McElroy (1996) and Bishop and Mane (2001) examine the effects of 
measures of students’ ability on dropout.   13
Looking at the local variables, we observe that dropout is lower in the more urbanized 
provinces. On the contrary, there is not any significant relationship with the unemployment 
rate thus reflecting the uncertainty of its role in affecting dropout behavior. Higher 
employment probability may convince students to quit school and enter labor market but may 
also increase expected education returns and thus stimulate the youngsters to acquire further 
education. Apart from the ambiguity of the relationship between unemployment rate and 
dropout behavior, another explanation for the non significance of the coefficient is the 
heterogeneity of individuals. In other terms, aggregate unemployment rates are likely to be 
little or no concern to those who drop out just because they already found a job. Finally, 
dropout is positively correlated with the relevance of the industry sector among the economic 
activities. This result seems to confirm the traditional view of the private industry in Italy that 
is characterized by “low intensity of education” and by reliance on internal training. 
Among the school inputs, full time and better school infrastructures positively affect the 
probability of staying in school. Both variables have a substantial effect: moving the incidence 
of full time from the first quartile to the third quartile (the quality of school infrastructure from 
the third quartile to the first quartile) halves the likelihood of dropout. The widespread 
adoption of the full-time schooling positively affects the youngsters’ cognitive development 
and human capital acquisition and therefore it should decrease the dropout risk. Poor school 
infrastructures may hamper youngsters’ motivation to study and contribute to the view that the 
school environment is not an opportunity to grow and learn; they can also approximate the 
level of spending and care of local authorities. Following the psycho-sociological models 
pioneered by Tinto (1975), the adoption of full time and better school infrastructures may also 
improve the person-environment fit, help the students to feel more connected with the 
educational system, and incentive their enrolment in upper secondary school. 
5.2    School choice  
Most of the literature has investigated the determinants of the level of education achieved 
whereas the type of the education is less explored, thus neglecting its strong influence on later 
school transition and one’s professional career. To address this issue, we examine the school 
choice of those who continue to study after the completion of compulsory schooling. 
School choices are examined using a multinomial logit model. We considered four 
possible alternatives: LI = enrolled in licei, VS = enrolled in vocational schools, TS = enrolled 
in technical schools, and AT = enrolled in art schools or teaching schools. Under the standard 
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where X represent the covariates referring to individual i, and β is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated and that varies across alternatives j. Results are reported in Table 5.
25 In order to 
make “visible” the effect of some explanatory variables of special interest, we report in Table 
6 the probability of educational choices associated with different “typos”.
26  
There are substantial gender differences in track choice, and female students are more 
apt to choose an educational path in the arts, humanities or more academically oriented 
curricula. In particular, the probability of being enrolled in technical or vocational school is 67 
percent for males and 31 percent for females. Conversely, the likelihood of being enrolled in 
art and teaching school or in the licei is much higher for females. The education of both 
parents is one of the main determinants of the school choice. The probability of a young 
person choosing vocational or technical schools is more than 60 percent if both parents have 
only compulsory education, and decreases to 10 percent if they are graduated; in the latter 
case, the licei option is definitely the most likely (nearly 90 percent). The impact of family 
background on school choice arises also when considering the effect of father’s employment 
status: the son of a blue-collar or self-employed has a greater probability of choosing 
vocational or technical schools than the son of a white-collar.
27  The impact of family 
background on children’s educational choice may operate through several channels. It may 
reflect the intergenerational transmission of ability and skills trough both nature and nurture; 
alternatively it may be related to the transmission of preferences.
28 There may be also a more 
direct effect whereby parents encourage or coerce children, regardless of their ability and 
interests. Finally, it may be the result of a rational choice: those who come from a less-
advantaged family tend to choose less risky – less difficult or shorter – investment in human 
capital such as vocational and technical schools that guarantee employability right after the 
diploma. We are not able to disentangle these channels and our estimated coefficients have to 
be interpreted as total effect of family background. 
Experiencing a school failure also affects the type of school chosen. The probability of 
being enrolled in vocational school is 9 percent if a young person regularly completed 
compulsory school, but increases to 37 percent if he accumulated a delay. More generally, 
about 70 percent of those students who experienced a school failure in compulsory school 
choose, if they continue to study, a vocational or a technical school. 
As far as the labor market variables are concerned, the likelihood of being enrolled in 
vocational schools (and art and teaching schools) is lower where the unemployment rate is 
higher. Therefore in depressed labor market, vocational schools do not appear as a profitable 
investment and youngsters prefer to enroll in licei. A higher incidence of the tertiary sector 
                                                 
25 The logit probabilities exhibit the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives property (IIA), which implies that the odds of 
two alternatives, j and k, do not depend on the other existing alternatives. The Hausman test does not reject the IIA property, 
therefore, the multinomial logit may be considered as an appropriate specification for the problem analyzed. 
26 The representative typo is the one with all explanatory variables at their mean. The exercise consists in analyzing how 
probabilities vary when considering values different from the mean for some of the covariates, thus identifying different typos. 
27 The effects of mother’s occupation are considerably weaker than those for father’s occupation. 
28 Children assimilate norms and practices associated with different types and levels of education at home, and they may tend 
to choose the track with which they are most familiar.   15
among the economic activities is associated with a greater probability of choosing technical or 
vocational schools. In particular, the presence of services that are less human-capital intensive 
(wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, storage and transports, etc.) is correlated 
with a stronger preference for vocational schools whereas services that are more human-
capital intensive (financial intermediation, entrepreneurial activities, etc.) lead to a greater 
probability of technical schools being chosen. 
We repeat the same empirical exercise, using different specifications of the dependent 
variables, aggregating the school choice in VS & TS and AT & LI where VS & TS stands for 
vocational and technical schools that are more directly connected with the labor market, and 
AT & LI stands for art and teaching schools and licei that are more academically oriented (see 
the last column of Table 5). Finally, we consider the entire flow sampling of those who got 
their license the year before the interview thus including also those who decided to not 
continue to study. In this way we do not have any selection issues that may bias our estimates 
and we simply add a further alternative (NE that stays for not enrolled) in the multinomial 
logit model (see Table 7). In both cases our results are unaffected and, for brevity, we do not 
provide any further comments about these. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
School failure in compulsory school is widespread, but also surprisingly under-investigated. 
Post-compulsory educational choices (early dropout and track choices) represent the first 
circumstance when an individual make a decision and, probably, it is one of the most 
important he ever makes. To assess the determinants of these phenomena, we built a dataset 
combining individual data by LFS, aggregate data on the local labor market, and a rich set of 
variables describing the features of the school system at the local level. 
We showed that about 8 percent of 15-year-old Italians have repeated at least one year in 
compulsory school, and this has important consequences on future choices. We also showed 
that the school failure risk is strongly conditioned by a young person’s economic and cultural 
background. School fails to fill-up the gaps of those coming from less-advantaged families, 
whereas initial inequalities are increasingly strengthened with the compelling risk of mistaking 
privilege with merit in the school environment. The fact that the “social” selection starts at this 
early age deserves greater attention in the policy debate. 
We also examined post-compulsory educational choices of the youngsters in terms of 
both dropout decision and track choice. Leaving school early, in an economy characterized by 
technological and productive change in which knowledge and competencies play a key role, 
may lead to professional and social marginalization. Those who continue to study choose the 
type of secondary school they will attend, which, in turn, will affect to a large extent their 
future choices and careers. Both early dropouts and track choices are strongly affected by 
parents’ education and father’s occupation, also through the channels of parents’ aspirations   16
and economic resources and their conjectures about children’s abilities. Furthermore, the 
enrollment of less gifted students seems to be one of the main features of vocational schools.  
The results of the paper allow us to discuss the effectiveness of the educational system 
when narrowing failure risk and scholastic outflow and to suggest some policy options. School 
failures and early dropouts do not seem to be the result of limited resources invested in 
education; expenditure per primary and secondary student is above the corresponding OECD 
averages (see OECD, 2006). The pupils-class ratio is not significant in all the specifications 
examined. On the contrary, promising results arise when considering the functioning of the 
educational system, how resources are spent and the role of teachers. The adoption of full time 
reduce both failure and dropout risks. It solves practical problems for those families where 
both parents work, and it represents an opportunity for the educational development, 
especially of those who come from a less-advantaged families and with a smaller amount of 
cultural capital at home. A lower incidence of teachers with temporary contracts plays a 
significant role in reducing school failures. A higher incidence of temporary contracts 
necessarily implies more teachers’ turnover, lower knowledge of the class and lack of 
didactical continuity; it can also approximate, given the temporal perspective of the job and 
the absence of any evaluation mechanism for their activity, the degree of motivation and effort 
of the teaching staff (see Barbieri et al., 2007). Finally, the quality of school infrastructures 
contributes significantly to the reduction of early dropouts. Poor school infrastructures may 
affect the level and quality of the teaching and could consequently create a less than 
stimulating school environment; they can also approximate the level of spending of local 
authorities and how much education is evaluated in the local context. 
The analysis of the determinants of school failures and dropouts offers also an insight 
into the results on students’ competencies provided by PISA. Italian students are among the 
lowest achiever in Europe; their results are largely affected by the family background and 
strong territorial differences arise.
29  However, the target population considered by PISA 
excludes early leavers and strongly under-represents students who are still enrolled in 
compulsory school. Since the selected sample of the interviewed, as we have showed above, is 
strongly related to the family background and to the place of residence, then we expect a 
downward bias in PISA studies when assessing the influence of family background and the 
North-South divide in students’ competencies. 
                                                 
29 See OECD (2006) and, for a discussion of the territorial differences and the role of family background, Bratti et al. (2007) 
and Montanaro (2008).   17
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Table A.2: Distribution of pupils for regularity of education path (1) 
School level  Regular  Late 
      
Primary school  91,6  3,1 
Lower secondary school  86,0  10,3 
Upper secondary school  71,1  24,6 
      
Source: MPE.  




Table A.3: Distribution of enrolled in upper secondary school (1)  
School type:   
  
Vocational schools  20,9 
Technical schools  36,0 
Liceo in humanities  10,0 
Liceo in scientific activities  21,4 
Art school  3,9 
Teaching schools  7,9 
  
Source: MPE.  
(1) School year 2004/05. 
 
Table A.1: Participation rates (1) 
School year:  15-18 years  15 years 
    
2000/01       78,7  90,1 
2001/02 80,5  92,9 
2002/03   82,0  94,4 
2003/04 83,2  94,7 
2004/05 83,6  93,1 
2005/06 84,4  93,4 
  
Source: MPE. 
(1) The participation rate is given by the number of youngsters enrolled at school (any level) per 100 
youngsters of the correspondent age.  21
 
 
Table A.4: Data description 
Explanatory variables  Description (source)  Mean (std. dev.) 
Female  Gender; = 1 if female (LFS). 0.47  (0.499) 
First born  Birth order; = 1 if first born (LFS). 0.54  (0.498) 
Parental age  Maximum age between father’s and mother’s one; age is normalized to child’s 
year of birth (LFS). 
32.2 (7.157) 
Number of siblings  Number of siblings (LFS). 2.24  (0.914) 
Father’s education  Father’s years of schooling (LFS). 9.18  (4.709) 
Mother’s education  Mother’s years of schooling (LFS). 9.83  (4.131) 
Father’s employment status 
   employee 
   blue-collar 
   self-employee 
   atypical 
   unemployed 
   Inactive 
 
= 1 if senior executive or employee 
= 1 if blue-collar 
= 1 if entrepreneur, member of professions or self-employee 
= 1 if temporary contract 
= 1 if looking for a job 








Mother’s employment status 
   employee 
   blue-collar 
   self-employee 
   part-time 
   unemployed 
   Inactive 
 
= 1 if senior executive or employee 
= 1 if blue-collar 
= 1 if entrepreneur, member of professions or self-employee 
= 1 if part-time job 
= 1 if looking for a job 








Metropolis  Degree of urbanization; = 1 if the main municipality of the province has more 
than 250,000 inhabitants (Istat). 
0.12 (0.235) 
Youth unemployment  Unemployment rate for people in the age bracket 15-24 (Istat). 23.2  (12.94) 
Industry  Percentage of workers in industry sector (Istat). 20.9  (9.007) 
Services  Percentage of worker in tertiary sector (Istat). 64.3  (7.754) 
Low  services  Percentage of workers in services that are less human-capital intensive: 
wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants, garage, storage and 
transports (Istat). 
27.2 (4.398) 
High  services  Percentage of workers in services that are more human-capital intensive: 
financial intermediation, entrepreneurial activities and other services (Istat). 
37.1 (5.993) 
Pupils-class ratio  Average number of pupils per class (MPE). 20.7  (1.169) 
Full time  Percentage of students with full time (MPE). 29.6  (13.65) 
Temporary teachers  Percentage of teachers with temporary contracts (MPE). 17.0  (7.239) 
Poor school infrastructures  Index built averaging the percentages of schools with buildings unfit to school, 
those improperly adapted to teaching activity, and those with poor 
maintenance of floors, heating systems, wirings, bathroom fixtures and fittings 
(MPE). 
30.3 (14.29) 
Note: the descriptive statistics of the individual and family background variables refer to the sample of 15-year olds used in section 4. Variables on features of the 
educational system refer to lower secondary education. All local variables are at a province level. 
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(1) The Index that measures the quality of school infrastructures is built averaging the percentages of schools with 
buildings unfit to school, of those improperly adapted to teaching activity, and of those with poor maintenance of 
floors, heating systems, wirings, bathroom fixtures and fittings. Provinces are divided in quartiles according to the 
index: those with a lighter blue have better school infrastructures with respect to the others, and viceversa.   23
Regression tables 
Table 3: The determinants of school failures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Female  -0.321** -0.326** -0.313** -0.306**  -0.342*** 
  (0.126) (0.128) (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.129) 
First born  0.014  0.032 0.006 0.013  0.018 
  (0.114) (0.114) (0.112)  (0.113)  (0.112) 
Parental age  -0.032***  -0.030** -0.030*** -0.028**  -0.032*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Number of siblings  0.200*** 0.181** 0.185***  0.192***  0.182** 
  (0.075) (0.076) (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.076) 
Father’s education  -0.061**  -0.056** -0.061** -0.061**  -0.059** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Mother’s education  -0.048*  -0.054* -0.049* -0.049*  -0.051* 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Father’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  0.336*  0.356* 0.319* 0.328*  0.335* 
  (0.195) (0.194) (0.189)  (0.189)  (0.196) 
Self-employee 0.189  0.223 0.194 0.207  0.185 
  (0.181) (0.185) (0.178)  (0.179)  (0.183) 
Atypical 0.553**  0.555** 0.504** 0.516**  0.568** 
  (0.249) (0.250) (0.248)  (0.246)  (0.247) 
Unemployed 0.391  0.381 0.387 0.402  0.380 
  (0.300) (0.297) (0.288)  (0.292)  (0.300) 
Inactive 0.249  0.277 0.262 0.259  0.261 
  (0.266) (0.266) (0.260)  (0.261)  (0.265) 
Mother’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue  collar  0.184 0.191 0.182 0.179  0.184 
  (0.313) (0.307) (0.301)  (0.300)  (0.312) 
Self-employee -0.652*  -0.633 -0.651*  -0.630*  -0.697* 
  (0.383) (0.391) (0.377)  (0.375)  (0.390) 
Part time  0.046  0.070 0.048 0.051  0.053 
  (0.219) (0.220) (0.215)  (0.215)  (0.218) 
Unemployed 0.511*  0.471 0.462 0.453  0.509* 
  (0.307) (0.309) (0.305)  (0.305)  (0.309) 
Inactive -0.045  -0.037 -0.037 -0.048  -0.031 
  (0.228) (0.225) (0.219)  (0.220)  (0.224) 
Metropolis -0.114  0.060 0.092 0.042  0.035 
  (0.144) (0.143) (0.178)  (0.158)  (0.176) 
Youth unemployment  0.011 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Full time  -0.019***        -0.018** 
 (0.007)        (0.007) 
Temporary teachers    0.031**      0.031** 
   (0.015)      (0.015) 
Poor school infrastructures      -0.015    -0.011 
     (0.017)    (0.015) 
Pupils-class  ratio      -0.031  -0.019 
      (0.109)  (0.106) 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES  YES 
Regional fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 1.684  1.684 1.804 1.829  1.684 
The sample includes all 15-year olds who were interviewed during the first half of the year and who had birthday before the 
interview. The dependent variable in the logit model is: 1 = school failure (still enrolled in compulsory school or not enrolled without 
completion of compulsory school); 0 = otherwise. See table 1 in the text. The number of observations changes across specification 
because some school variables are not available for all provinces. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** 
significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4: The determinants of early dropouts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.220  0.224  0.254 0.240 0.251 0.240 
  (0.155) (0.150) (0.152) (0.148) (0.165) (0.160) 
First  born  -0.373** -0.341** -0.342** -0.341** -0.415** -0.413** 
  (0.169) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) (0.175) (0.180) 
Delay 1 year  0.943*** 0.914*** 0.938*** 0.923*** 1.025*** 0.998*** 
  (0.243) (0.237) (0.239) (0.242) (0.241) (0.250) 
Delay 2 years or more  2.234*** 2.243*** 2.366*** 2.354*** 2.313*** 2.364*** 
  (0.423) (0.419) (0.415) (0.389) (0.434) (0.442) 
Parental age  0.006  0.004 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.004 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Number of siblings  -0.069  -0.079 -0.030 -0.039 -0.043 -0.039 
  (0.122) (0.121) (0.112) (0.114) (0.119) (0.121) 
Father’s education  -0.054  -0.047  -0.056* -0.053* -0.063* -0.062* 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) 
Mother’s education  -0.030  -0.036 -0.039 -0.037 -0.027 -0.028 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Father’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  0.477**  0.403*  0.341 0.316  0.414*  0.428* 
  (0.237) (0.239) (0.248) (0.230) (0.245) (0.248) 
Self-employee 0.180  0.127 0.218 0.134 0.196 0.210 
  (0.304) (0.287) (0.279) (0.267) (0.315) (0.312) 
Atypical  1.173*** 1.076*** 1.098*** 1.045*** 1.143*** 1.185*** 
  (0.339) (0.326) (0.336) (0.319) (0.349) (0.346) 
Unemployed 0.610  0.579 0.567 0.459 0.530 0.577 
  (0.406) (0.395) (0.431) (0.414) (0.435) (0.441) 
Inactive  1.107*** 1.022*** 1.003*** 0.968*** 1.034*** 1.063*** 
  (0.329) (0.326) (0.330) (0.313) (0.334) (0.337) 
Mother’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  0.246  0.283  0.238 0.250 0.203 0.247 
  (0.303) (0.301) (0.303) (0.297) (0.310) (0.304) 
Self-employee 0.357  0.368 0.472 0.477 0.380 0.439 
  (0.363) (0.371) (0.360) (0.349) (0.370) (0.361) 
Part time  0.056  0.114 0.182 0.165 0.037 0.119 
  (0.332) (0.330) (0.321) (0.316) (0.335) (0.326) 
Unemployed 0.126  0.168 0.136 0.169 0.125 0.165 
  (0.299) (0.302) (0.303) (0.295) (0.308) (0.308) 
Inactive  0.033 0.094 0.034 0.074 -0.016  -0.003 
  (0.317) (0.322) (0.314) (0.309) (0.317) (0.308) 
Metropolis -0.479**  -0.309*  -0.548*** -0.382** -0.819*** -0.557** 
  (0.200) (0.179) (0.211) (0.187) (0.268) (0.292) 
Youth unemployment  0.023* 0.018 -0.001 0.013 0.012 0.001 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Industry  0.040*** 0.034**  0.023 0.015  0.046***   
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)   
Services        - 0 . 0 2 7 *  
        (0.015) 
Full time   -0.020***      -0.021***  -0.019*** 
 (0.007)        (0.007)  (0.007) 
Temporary teachers   -0.006    -0.007  -0.003 
   (0.016)    (0.017)  (0.016) 
Poor school infrastructures      0.021**    0.027***  0.025*** 
     (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Pupils-class  ratio      0.122  0.067  0.119 
      (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.075) 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Area  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1.412  1.412 1.525 1.547 1.412 1.412 
The sample includes all the youngsters who complete compulsory school the year before the interview; they were interviewed during the first 
half of the year and had birthday before the interview. The dependent variable in the logit model is: 1 = early dropout (not enrolled after the 
completion of compulsory school); 0 = otherwise. See table 2 in the text. The number of observations changes across specification because 
some school variables are not available for all provinces. Area fixed effects include: North West, North East, Centre, South and Islands. 
Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 





Table 5: The determinants of school choice after compulsory schooling 
  Ref. category = LI  Ref. category = LI & AT 
  VS TS AT  VS & TS 
Female -1.110***  -1.522***  1.032***  -1.656*** 
 (5.83)  (8.64)  (3.33)  (10.55) 
First born  -0.115  -0.048  0.100  -0.099 
 (0.42)  (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.66) 
Delay 1 year  1.962** -0.166  -0.658  1.104* 
  (2.56) (0.23) (0.70)  (1.85) 
Delay 2 years or more  4.469*** 3.568***  -31.630***  4.134*** 
  (5.30) (4.00)  (38.05)  (4.54) 
Parental age  -0.051**  -0.031* -0.045*  -0.026 
 (2.21)  (1.73)  (1.65)  (1.52) 
Number of siblings  0.283* 0.235 0.345*  0.145 
 (1.75)  (1.61)  (1.95)  (1.18) 
Father’s education  -0.142** -0.061*  -0.050  -0.070** 
 (2.45)  (1.74)  (0.99)  (2.20) 
Mother’s education  -0.278*** -0.200***  -0.105**  -0.200*** 
 (5.36)  (5.42)  (2.26)  (5.85) 
Father’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  0.729**  0.701**  0.487  0.603** 
 (2.07)  (2.14)  (1.41)  (2.43) 
Self-employee 0.498  0.418  0.270  0.382* 
 (1.45)  (1.62)  (0.93)  (1.77) 
Atypical 0.787  0.290  0.101  0.408 
 (1.12)  (0.63)  (0.21)  (0.92) 
Unemployed 0.135  0.060  0.089  0.059 
 (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Inactive 0.739  0.708** -0.577  0.778** 
 (1.49)  (2.01)  (0.90)  (2.27) 
Mother’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  0.591  0.239  0.341  0.302 
 (1.59)  (0.59)  (0.88)  (0.96) 
Self-employee -0.024  0.231  -0.192  0.215 
 (0.05)  (0.69)  (0.34)  (0.61) 
Part time  -0.036  -0.151  0.036  -0.089 
 (0.11)  (0.47)  (0.10)  (0.33) 
Unemployed 0.193  0.942**  1.206**  0.424 
 (0.33)  (1.98)  (2.32)  (1.15) 
Inactive 0.052  0.159 0.269  0.082 
  (0.13) (0.53) (0.80)  (0.28) 
Metropolis -0.263  -0.818**  0.727  -0.587** 
 (0.58)  (2.30)  (1.29)  (2.07) 
Youth unemployment  -0.060*** -0.004 -0.069***  -0.005 
 (2.60)  (0.23)  (2.61)  (0.40) 
High services  0.034 0.079*** -0.035   
 (1.18)  (3.64)  (0.97)   
Low services  0.067*** 0.027  0.044   
 (2.85)  (0.86)  (1.50)   
Services      0.053*** 
       (3.53) 
Year dummies  YES  YES 
Regional fixed effects  YES  YES 
Hausman Test  for IIA  for IIA  for IIA  - 
Observations 1.470  1.470 
The sample includes all the youngsters who complete compulsory school the year before the interview; they were interviewed during the 
first half of the year and had birthday before the interview. The alternatives in multinomial logit model are: VS = enrolled in vocational 
schools; TS = enrolled in technical schools; AT = enrolled in art and teaching schools; and LI = enrolled in licei (reference category). See 
table 2 in the text. The Hausman test of IIA assumption is repeated eliminating the alternatives in each column; “for IIA” means that the 
test does not reject that this property, implied by the MNL model, is valid. Standard errors are clustered at the province level; robust z 
statistics in parentheses; *, **, *** significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Probability of educational choices associated with different typos (1) 
  Vocational school  Technical school  Liceo  Art or teaching school 
Percentages predicted by the model  10,2  39,1  46,0  4,7 
Female 7,5  23,2  59,0  10,3 
Parents with compulsory education  16,1  46,4  33,0  4,5 
Parents with a university degree  0,7  9,1  87,7  2,6 
Blue-collar father  13,1  47,9  34,0  5,0 
Delay in compulsory school  36,6  33,5  28,3  1,6 
(1) Explanatory variables are considered at their mean value, if not otherwise specified. See regression in Table 5. 
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Table 7: The determinants of educational choice after compulsory schooling 
  Reference category = LI 
 NE  VS  TS  AT 
Female 0.066  -1.069***  -1.496***  1.035*** 
  (0.19) (5.65) (8.53)  (3.32) 
First born  -0.769**  -0.136  -0.054  0.114 
  (2.10) (0.50) (0.32)  (0.39) 
Delay 1 year  2.710*** 2.164***  -0.064  -0.617 
  (3.70) (3.14) (0.10)  (0.68) 
Delay 2 years or more  7.886*** 4.286*** 3.194*** -40.241*** 
  (7.32) (4.85) (3.20) (52.15) 
Parental age  -0.019  -0.044* -0.029  -0.047* 
  (0.38) (1.93) (1.59)  (1.82) 
Number of siblings  0.134 0.249 0.220 0.321* 
  (0.42) (1.53) (1.52)  (1.82) 
Father’s education  -0.181* -0.144*** -0.066*  -0.040 
  (1.81) (2.61) (1.88)  (0.86) 
Mother’s education  -0.228*** -0.282*** -0.194***  -0.108** 
  (3.07) (5.92) (5.36)  (2.31) 
Father’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue  collar  1.313** 0.714** 0.672**  0.503 
  (2.22) (2.03) (2.03)  (1.45) 
Self-employee  0.621 0.515 0.412  0.261 
  (0.96) (1.52) (1.59)  (0.91) 
Atypical 2.694***  0.836  0.287  0.050 
  (3.62) (1.34) (0.64)  (0.10) 
Unemployed  1.490 0.279 0.155  0.157 
  (1.36) (0.33) (0.22)  (0.20) 
Inactive 2.731***  0.704 0.737** -0.476 
  (3.63) (1.42) (2.18)  (0.76) 
Mother’s employment status:  Reference category: employee 
Blue collar  1.172*  0.523  0.231  0.339 
  (1.81) (1.42) (0.57)  (0.90) 
Self-employee  1.177 -0.114 0.245  -0.193 
  (1.48) (0.23) (0.74)  (0.34) 
Part time  0.555  -0.077  -0.136  0.050 
  (0.79) (0.23) (0.42)  (0.15) 
Unemployed 1.237  0.054  0.913*  1.192** 
  (1.60) (0.09) (1.92)  (2.30) 
Inactive 0.400  0.039 0.195  0.266 
  (0.51) (0.10) (0.66)  (0.82) 
Metropolis -1.408*  -0.264  -0.829**  0.715 
  (1.73) (0.58) (2.35)  (1.27) 
Youth unemployment  -0.035 -0.057*** -0.003  -0.070*** 
  (1.01) (2.61) (0.21)  (2.62) 
High services  0.073 0.031  0.079***  -0.036 
  (1.29) (1.11) (3.70)  (0.98) 
Low services  -0.018 0.059** 0.020  0.042 
  (0.27) (2.53) (0.65)  (1.45) 
Year dummies  YES 
Regional fixed effects  YES 
Hausman Test  for IIA  for IIA  for IIA  for IIA 
Observations 1.547 
The sample includes all the youngsters who complete compulsory school the year before the interview; they were 
interviewed during the first half of the year and had birthday before the interview. The alternatives in multinomial logit model 
are: NE = not enrolled; VS = enrolled in vocational schools; TS = enrolled in technical schools; AT = enrolled in art and 
teaching schools; and LI = enrolled in licei (reference category). See table 2 in the text. The Hausman test of IIA assumption 
is repeated eliminating the alternatives in each column; “for IIA” means that the test does not reject that this property, implied 
by the MNL model, is valid. Standard errors are clustered at the province level; robust z statistics in parentheses; *, **, *** 
significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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